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This study was conducted (1) to substantiate previous 
research findings that the effectiveness of the manipu­
lative behavior of high Machiavellians can be reduced 
by instructions to low Machiavellians and (2) to deter­
mine if this reduction holds over time or whether high 
Machiavellians are able to recover and once more become 
successful manipulators. Fifty-four female subjects, 
eighteen each of high, middle, and low Machiavellian 
orientation, played the Con Game in an effort to win 
points. In the control condition, the game was played 
according to the original instructions with no additional 
manipulation. Prior to the experimental sessions, how­
ever, low Machiavellians were given counter-Machiavellian 
instructions relative to the true nature of the experiment 
and then were allowed to proceed according to the original 
instructions. Although it had been hypothesized that low 
Machiavellians in the experimental group would initially 
score more points .in the Con Game than high Machiavellians 
and would sustain the advantage, analysis of variance of 
the data indicated that no significant differences in 
point accumulation were found for high or lox\r Machiavel­
lians throughout the games in either the experimental or 
control condition. Experimental subjects did, however, 
reject significantly more proposals to form coalitions in 
the game than control subjects (p <.01). Likewise, more 
proposals x̂ ere made to subjects in the experimental group 
over the control group (p <06) and it was found that low 
Machiavellians in the control group broke more proposals 
(p<_.07) at an inopportune time, xdiile in the experimental 
group, high Machiavellians made the same error more fre­
quently. Thus, although no significant differences in 
overall point accumulation in the Con Game were noted for 
high and low Machiavellians, a significant effect of the 
experimental manipulation was demonstrated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of Study
Research has demonstrated that individuals with a strong 
Machiavellian orientation, when placed in certain situations, 
are able to continually manipulate or manage the behavior of 
others who have less of a Machiavellian orientation. When 
given prior information about what to expect, however, it 
.appears that low Machiavellian subjects are able, for at 
least a short time, to resist manipulation effectively. The 
purpose of the present investigation was, then, twofold:
1. An attempt was made to substantiate previous re­
search findings that the effectiveness of the 
manipulative behavior of high Machiavellians 
can be reduced by instructions to low Machs.
2. An attempt was made to determine if this re­
duction would hold over time or whether high 
Machiavellians would be able to recover and 
once again become successful manipulators.
Introduction to Machiavellian Research
With the publication of The Prince in 1532, Machiavelli 
presented a view of man as characterized by guile, deceit,
1
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and opportunism in interpersonal relations. The term 
"Machiavellian," then, became associated with those people 
who view and manipulate others for their own purposes.
Although the concept of Machiavellianism dates well 
back into history, it has only been recently that this phe­
nomenon has come to the attention of experimentally-oriented 
social scientists. One of the first to attempt experimental 
examination of this topic was Richard Christie, a psychologist 
from Columbia University. Through study of Machiavelli1s 
works, Christie hypothesized that certain specific traits 
would characterize the Machiavellian individual. These in­
clude a relative lack of affect in interpersonal relation­
ships, a lack of concern with conventional morality, a lack 
of gross psychopathology, and a low ideological commitment 
(Christie, 1970a). From this, Christie developed the Mach 
Scales (Mach l'V and Mach V) for the purpose of identifying 
those individuals with high and low Machiavellian orienta­
tion.
Mach IV (see Appendix A) consists of a twenty item 
Likert format scale in which ten items are keyed to endorse­
ment of Machiavellian statements and ten are keyed in the 
opposite direction to avoid the problem of acquiescent 
response style. The items themselves are paraphrased 
statements taken directly from Machiavelli*s writings. Due 
to the apparent high correlation between this scale and the 
scales of social desirability, however (Budner, 1962), Mach V
3
was constructed (see Appendix B) in an attempt to reduce the 
effects of social desirability. Mach V also is made up of 
twenty items, each consisting of three statements of which 
the respondent must choose the one most true of his own 
beliefs and the one most false. One statement in each item 
is identical to Mach IV items. Since the statements have 
been matched for social desirability, this forced-choice 
technique makes it difficult for the average respondent to 
determine which is the socially '’correct” answer.
Research by Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger (1966) indi­
cated that the reliability of Mach IV is in the .70's while 
that of Mach V averages in the .60's. Lowin (1966) found 
retest reliability (from three weeks to two months) to be 
+.70 for Mach IV and +.59 for Mach V.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Personality Correlates
Since the development of the Mach Scales, research on 
Machiavellianism has extended in many directions, making it 
difficult to distinguish any single explicit trend of study. 
However, it appears that much effort has been given to the 
correlation of specific personality variables with Machia­
vellianism. For example, a factor analytic study conducted 
by Wrightsman and Cook (1965) indicated that manifest hos­
tility, anomie, verbal hostility, anti-police attitude, and 
suspicion were significantly related to Machiavellianism.
A negative correlation was demonstrated between faith in 
human nature and a high Mach orientation. In comparing 
Mach IV responses of both male and female college students 
with a scale designed to measure philosophy of human nature, 
Wrightsman (1964) found that Machiavellianism was signifi­
cantly negatively correlated, with trustworthiness, altruism, 
independence, and strength of will. No relationship was 
demonstrated between a belief in the complexity and vari­
ability of human nature and Machiavellianism.
A number of studies have been conducted in an attempt
4
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to correlate Machiavellianism with measures of intellectual 
ability. Christie (1970b) reported that the Verbal scores 
on the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), given to 161 
medical students, showed no significant correlation with 
Machiavellianism. Likewise, intelligence aptitude scores 
for 115 students at Columbia University were not related 
to their Mach IV and Mach V scores. Singer (1964) reported 
that in a sample of 994 entering students at Pennsylvania 
State University, no significant correlation was found be­
tween Mach V scores and the Moore-Castore tests of intel­
lectual aptitude. However, the fact that no standardized 
data were available for this locally constructed test re­
duces the generality of this study. Wrightsman and Cook 
(1964) attempted to correlate the Mach IV scores of 177 
female college students with the individual subtests of 
the Guilford-Zimmerman Abilities Test. None of the correla­
tions were significant at the .05 level. It appears then 
that intellectual ability is not related to Machiavellianism,
sat least for such intellectually homogeneous subjects. It 
should be noted, however, that this homogeneity may have 
operated to reduce the magnitude of the correlations re­
ported in these studies.
Two studies have explored the relationship betx^een 
Machiavellianism and need for achievement. Weinstock (1964) 
administered Strodtbeck’s (1958) eight-item achievement 
scale and nine items from the Mach IV Scale to fifty
6
Hungarian refugees. A correlation of +.29, significant at 
the .05 level, was found. Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger 
(1966) gave fifty-four college male subjects a ten-item 
test of need for achievement. The results of this test 
were found to correlate -.03 with Mach scores. The fact 
that American subjects were used in the latter research as 
well as the administration of the total Mach Scale, may give 
greater validity to the Geis et al. study. However, at 
present, the only conclusion that seems warranted is that 
more research is needed to determine the relationship of 
Machiavellianism to need for achievement.
With regard to authoritarianism, several studies have 
attempted to show a relationship between this characteris­
tic and Machiavellianism by examining F-Scale and Mach Scale 
scores, Christie (1970b) reported that in 1955-56 he ad­
ministered the Mach Scales and F-Scales to nine groups (four 
classes of medical students and five of college undergrad­
uates) of subjects. No correlation between the two scales 
was found. In 1964, however, the same procedure, adminis­
tered to 1782 college students, yielded a statistically 
significant correlation of -.20. Christie accounted for 
this discrepancy over time by referring to the increasing 
sophistication of society and to the increase in test 
sophistication of more recent students, making them less 
prone to agree with F-Scale items. However, he also sug­
gested the possibility that Mach scores are increasing over
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time. Again, it appears that more research is needed to 
determine what, if any, trends are occurring in this regard.
In attempting to assess the political preferences of 
high Machs and high F-Scale scorers, Wrightsman, Radloff, 
Horton, and Mecherikoff (1961) gave a battery of scales 
(including Mach IV) to college students before the 1960 
election. Results indicated that high F-Scale individuals 
significantly favored a Republican orientation. However, 
no relationship was found between preference for a partic­
ular political party and Machiavellianism, which was inter­
preted as congruent with the hypothesized low ideological 
commitment of high Machs,
Primavera and Higgins (1973) correlated the scores of 
104 undergraduates on the Breskin Test of Non-verbal Rigid­
ity, the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, and Christie's Mach Scale. 
They found that non-verbal rigidity was not related to 
either Machiavellianism or dogmatism but that dogmatism 
showed a low, positive relationship (significant at the 
.05 level) to Machiavellianism.
To explore racial attitudes among high Machiavellians, 
Wrightsman and Cook'(1965) used white, southern college 
women as subjects. No relationship was found between a 
Machiavellian orientation and measures of racial attitude. 
However, there was a significant tendency for these Machi­
avellian women to stereotype indiscriminantly both whites 
and blacks. It would be interesting to replicate this
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study using males or northerners as subjects to determine 
if similar results obtain.
Using the same subjects as in the study above, Wrights­
man and Cook (1964) also attempted to correlate Machiavellian­
ism with scales on the MMPI. They found a correlation of -.27 
between Mach IV and the K-Scale (a measure of test-taking 
defensiveness) on the MMPI. Similarly, the Lie Scale of the 
MMPI correlated -.40 with Machiavellianism. If these find­
ings can be generalized, they suggest that high Mach scorers 
give relatively fewer positive self-references than the gen­
eral population when taking tests and that they are rela­
tively sophisticated with regard to statements concerning 
themselves.
Harris (1966) attempted to examine how Machiavellians 
evaluate others. Employing seventy-six male subjects, he 
had each subject interact separately with a high Mach and a 
low Mach on the task of rating characters in Waiting for 
'Godot (Beckett, 1954). Later, using a semantic differential, 
each subject was asked to rate a partner. It was found 
that high Machs rated their partner significantly lower on 
"good” qualities than did low Machs. These data strongly 
suggest that the negative view taken by high Machs of their 
fellow man is not restricted to general statements that show 
up on tests, but is also true of ratings made of actual per­
sons with whom they have just interacted.
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Rosenblatt and Hannum (1969) examined the relationship 
between Machiavellianism and sociopathy using females in a 
penal institution as subjects. They were given the Mach IV 
Scale, the .Mach V Scale, and the Coalition-Triad Game, as 
well as peer and self ratings to determine Machiavellian 
orientation. To assess tendencies toward sociopathy, the 
women were given selected MMPI scales and the Lykken Scale. 
In addition, judgments by institutional psychologists and 
biographical data were utilized. Results indicated no sig­
nificant relationship between sociopathic tendencies and 
Mach iave11i an i sm.
In an attempt to experimentally assess the ability of 
Machiavellians to manipulate others, Geis, Christie, and 
Nelson (1970) designed a rather complex study. High and 
low Machs were individually tested by a confederate on an 
embedded figures test. Later the subjects were told that 
their experimenter (the confederate) had performed some 
deceptions when giving them feedback. The subjects were 
then asked to test a subject (another confederate) on the 
same measure and were told that they could be as deceptive 
as they wished. Results indicated that high Machs were 
significantly more manipulative than low Machs in both 
number and variety of manipulative techniques. Furthermore, 
high Machs were more innovative in their manipulations and, 
according to later questionnaires, enjoyed the manipulation 
more. It was found, however, that high Machiavellians were
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neither more punitive nor more suggestible than low Machs.
A number of studies have been concerned with opinion 
change as related to various degrees of Machiavellianism. 
Jones, Gergen, and Davis (1963) found that high Machs were 
relatively unaffected by positive or negative feedback about 
their personalities while low Machs changed significantly in 
the direction of giving positive self-descriptions after 
receiving a negative evaluation of their personality. Harris 
(1966), in assessing judgment independence, found that high 
Machs did not change their ratings of fictional characters 
when confronted with dissimilar ratings by others. Low Machs, 
on the other hand, shifted to agree more with their partner. 
Feiler £1967) engaged high and low Mach subjects in two de­
bates in one of which each subject was forced to defend an
issue contrary to his own belief. Attitude change ratings 
suggested that low Machs changed their position after both 
consonant and dissonant debates, while high Machiavellians 
showed no significant change in either situation. From 
this research, it can be speculated that Machiavellians 
are relatively impervious to external influence.
Game Playing Behavior
Another emphasis in Machiavellian research has been
placed on competitive game playing behavior of high and
low Machs. Cne of the frequently used games is the Con 
Ga?ne developed by Geis (1964), xvhich attempts to measure
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success at manipulating others. In an initial study utiliz­
ing this game, Geis (1970) used sets of three players--a 
high Mach, a middle Mach, and a low Mach. Degree of ambig­
uity and degree of power were varied in this competitive 
game situation. It was found that high Machs outbargained 
lows and consistently won more points in the game. Simi­
larly, highs were even more successful when the bargaining 
situation was more ambiguous, but highs failed to increase 
their success more than lows did with an increase in power 
position in the groups. It appears, then, that Machiavel­
lians are able to successfully manipulate others. What, is 
more, they are best able to exploit their manipulative 
talents in relatively ambiguous situations.
An attempt to replicate the above study, as well as 
assess the affects of social desirability on Machiavellian­
ism, was made by Doctor (1969). She not only found'no 
significant relationship between social desirability and 
Machiavellianism, but was also unable to obtain a signifi­
cant Machiavellian effect. Clearly, these results do not 
support Geis* hypothesis that Machiavellianism accounts for 
the variance among game scores. Doctor commented, however, 
that some methodological problems, as well as the small num­
ber of subjects utilized, may have seriously limited the 
generalizability of these results.
In the Ten Dollar Game, Christie and Geis (1970) 
examined the situation where the stakes were more tangible.
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Again, results indicated that high Machs won overwhelmingly.
It was proposed that the real stakes made the situation more 
serious which, while not affecting the high Machs, put lows 
at a disadvantage since a moral conflict may have been 
initiated due to the greater emotional value of the game.
Another game x^hich has been devised to assess Machiavel­
lian behavior is the Penny-Dollar Game (Christie, Gergen, 
and Marlowe, 1970), a variation of Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, 
each subject believes himself to be dependent upon another 
person in order to accumulate winnings. In this situation, 
high Machiavellians took a more cooperative rather than 
exploitive point of view, thus allowing both partners sup­
posedly to collect substantial winnings. The authors con­
cluded that the high Mach is a very rational game player. 
Similarly, results of questionnaires demonstrate that high 
Machs view others as they perceive themselves and so believe 
others to be fully capable of utilizing exploitive techniques. 
Thus, it is speculated that rather than risk retaliation 
from their partner for their own exploitation, the high Machs 
believed that in this case cooperation was more fruitful than 
mutual exploitation.
In line with the Machiavellian's hypothesized ration­
ality, a Legislature Game was developed to explicitly test 
the effect of emotionality on game outcome (Geis, Weinheimer, 
and Berger, 1966). Here, subjects were asked to make speeches 
concerning neutral, consonant, and dissonant issues in the
13
hopes of gaining votes from other players. Results indicate 
that when neutral issues were involved, both low and high 
Machs received an equal number of votes. On emotionally 
loaded issues, however,^high Machs significantly outscored 
lows. The authors hypothesize that the rationality of 
Machiavellians kept them from being distracted by emotional 
issues. Lows, however, became emotionally involved in the 
issues and thus were more easily distracted.
Other games devised to study Machiavellianism include 
a variation of dominos (Edelstein, 1966) and the Products 
Game (Hornstein and Deutsch, 1967). In general, the outcomes 
of game research with Machiavellians tend to be consistent-- 
high Mach subjects generally win and appear to become less 
involved in emotional issues which arise during play. One 
notable exception is a study by Wahlin (1967) who, using a 
variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, found that high 
Machs consistently lost more points than low Machs. How­
ever, in this situation, the "partner," a pre-programmed 
fictional opponent, tended to become vindictive when the 
subject became aggressive. Since high Machs were more aggres­
sive and competitive than lows, they tended to lose more 
points overall. These results appear to be contradictory to 
those described in the Penny-Dollar Game research (Christie, 
Gergen, and Marlowe, 1970) where high Machs took a relatively 
cooperative stand. Apparently, further research is needed 
to determine the nature of this discrepancy.
14
Antecedents of Machiavellianism
Recently, several studies have emerged which explore 
the antecedents of Machiavellianism. O ’Kelley and Solar 
(1971) attempted to correlate parental orientations toward 
Machiavellianism with similar attitudes in their children. 
They found that high Mach parents tended to have high Mach 
children while low Mach parents had low Mach offspring.
They hypothesize that social modeling is responsible for 
the emergence of a Machiavellian attitude. Touhey (1973), 
however, suggested that Machiavellianism arises from a 
failure to identify with parents. His findings suggested 
that only minimal support can be given to the hypothesis 
that children learn Machiavellianism from their parents or 
other family models. Rather, he concluded that Machiavel­
lianism emerges from sources outside the family. At pre­
sent, much more research needs to be conducted on this 
issue. It seems likely, however, that the origins of 
Machiavellianism are rather complex and may arise from 
various combinations of parental attitudes and external 
experiences.
Summary
In general, the research on Machiavellianism has sug­
gested that the high Machiavellian is a person who has mini­
mal affective involvement with both people and ideologies.
He does not seem to be bound by traditional morality and so
15
is able to disregard conventional concerns for the welfare 
of others. He behaves rationally in terms of his own adyan-• 
tage and does not appear to be overly influenced by guilt or 
anxiety. Likewise, he seems resistant to external attempts 
to change his ideas. Because of these characteristics, the 
Machiavellian has proven to be a highly successful manipulator 
of people. He usually wins in bargaining situations and has 
been shown (Geis, Christie, and Nelson, 1970) to more effec­
tively, and innovatively manipulate others in an experimental 
situation. Likewise, the Machiavellian is able to lie con­
vincingly when confronted with a misdeed (Erline, Thibaut, 
Hickey, and Gumpert, 1970).
Although the Machiavellian's manipulative tendencies 
have been frequently demonstrated through research, there 
have been exceptions where the high xMach has not been so 
successful. One such study (Wahlin, 1967) has already been 
mentioned. Similarly, Christie and Boehm (1970) attempted 
to evaluate the Machiavellian's ability to respond to subtle 
cues in a learning situation. Contrary to expectation, they 
found that the high Mach individual was not able to discrimi­
nate such cues readily. In fact, low Mach women were sig­
nificantly better! Research by Walters (1973) has shown 
that if low Machs are aware of the high Mach’s manipulative 
tendencies in the Con Game they are able, at least on a 
short term basis, to prevent the Machiavellian from winning 
in this bargaining situation. Thus, it appears that al-
16
though he is generally able to succeed in his dealings with 
others, the Machiavellian is not infallible. The present
Sresearch, then, was an attempt to replicate Walters' find­
ings and, furthermore, to explore the durability of the suc­
cess reversal.
Statement of Hypotheses
It has been demonstrated that low Machs, when given 
instructions as to what to expect, are able to overcome the 
advantage of the high Machs in a bargaining situation. How­
ever, it has been an open issue as to whether low Machs 
could maintain this advantage, or if high Machs would, over 
time, regain control. In theory, an equally good case could 
be made for either position. On the one hand, studies have 
shown that the high Machiavellian is a successful manipula­
tor and that he enjoys such manipulation (Geis, Christie and 
Nelson, 1970). Similarly, the fact that he has proven to be 
a convincing liar (Exline et al., 1961) attests to the high 
Mach's social skill in deceiving others. Thus, it could be 
predicted that the Machiavellian, if put at an initial dis­
advantage, will have both the desire and the means to regain 
control. On the other hand, research has demonstrated that 
the high Mach is a very rational game player who does not 
become involved in emotional issues (Christie, Gergen, and 
Marlowe, 1970). Thus, one could speculate that the Machia­
vellian may not become especially upset at losing. Simi-
17
larly, the fact that, at least at present, research does not 
support the notion that high Machs are unusually achievement' 
oriented (Geis et al., 1966), could lend one to hypothesize 
that the Machiavellian may not always be so concerned with 
winning that he feels a need to exert special effort to 
overcome the low Mach's advantage. It may be that the high 
Mach's manipulative tendencies are not the result of a con­
scious desire to exploit and manipulate others, but rather 
are a by-product of his uninvolved and generally detached 
life style. In this context, one could hypothesize that 
the high Machiavellian would not be concerned with regaining 
control per se but would continue to perform in the same 
rational, detached manner, regardless of the game outcome.
In analyzing the style of the loiv Mach game players, one 
notes especially this person's susceptibility to emotional 
issues (Geis et al., 1966) and his reluctance and lack of 
enjoyment in manipulating others (Geis, Christie, and Nel­
son, 1970). These factors may serve to reduce the low Mach's 
motivation to continue his initial advantage. On the other 
hand, although no research to date has been conducted to 
investigate this issue, it seems highly possible that the 
low Mach's emotional susceptibility will be more influenced 
by the experimenter's desires than by his concern for the 
welfare of the high Machs. In other words, it may be that 
the low Mach will be motivated to maintain his initial ad­
vantage in the games in order to please the experimenter
18
and that this motivation will override any distaste occurring 
from manipulating the high Machs.
Again, it must be emphasized that this issue of control 
over time has been an open one and that it was the purpose 
of the present study to make an empirical investigation of 
the issue. Nevertheless, it was the belief of the experi­
menter that the high Machs, when put at an initial disadvan­
tage, would not attempt to regain control in a bargaining 
situation due to an hypothesized lack of motivation to win 
for the sake of winning. .Likewise, it was predicted that 
low Machs would be able to sustain their initial advantage 
in an effort to cooperate with the experimenter and to please 
her.
Thus, specific hypotheses were:
1. Low Machs in the experimental group who earlier 
received counter-Machiavellian instructions will 
initially score more points in the Con Game than 
high Machs.
2. Low Machs will sustain this initial advantage 
over time,
3. Conversely, high Machs will not regain control 
of the game consistently win more points
than low Machs) oyer time.
CHAPTER III
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Subj ects
Subjects for the present study were selected from 184 
female undergraduate students at the University of Montana 
who were administered Christie’s Mach V Scale. The possible 
range of scores on this scale is between 40 and 160 points. 
Previous research (Christie, 19 70b) defined 40-79 as identify­
ing low Machs, 80-119 signifying middle Machs, and 120-160 
equaling high Machs. Scores on the present administration of 
the scale, however, ranged from 80 to 120 points. Since al­
most all scores fell within the objective scoring category 
of middle Machiavellian, it was decided to utilize relative 
scores, defining those scoring in the top one-third as high 
Machs, those falling in the middle one-third as middle Machs, 
and those scoring in the bottom one-third as low Machs.
Subjects were then ranked according to their Mach V 
scores. Those scoring at the high end of the scale were 
phoned in order (beginning with that subject scoring highest) 
and asked to participate in the study (as high Machs). Simi­
larly, those scoring lowest on the scale were called in order 
(beginning with that subject scoring lowest) and asked to
19
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participate until the appropriate number of low Machs was 
obtained. Middle Machs were selected from those subjects 
whose scores were one hundred points (the middle score on 
the scale) or closest to that score. This procedure re­
sulted in the selection of eighteen high Machiavellians, 
eighteen middle Machiavellianst and eighteen low Machiavel­
lian subjects. The ages of subjects ranged between seventeen 
and forty-two years, with a mean age of 19.4 years.
Procedure
From the sample of students given the Mach V Scale, 
fifty-four subjects, eighteen each of high, middle, and low 
Machs, were selected. One-half of the subjects in each 
group (high, middle, and low) were randomly assigned to a 
control group and one-half were assigned to an experimental 
condition. Six sessions (three for the control group and 
three for the experimental group) were scheduled, with each 
session consisting of a series of fifteen tournament games 
utilizing the Con Game (Geis, 1964) as the specific proce­
dure. In this game, three players (one high, one middle, 
and one low Mach) were seated around a game board at a small
table. The board (see Figure 1) had a path divided into
numbered spaces running from START at one side to FINISH in 
the center. The game was played with power cards, dice, and 
individual place markers. To begin, each player was given a
hand of six power cards, much like ordinary playing cards.
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These cards were identical for each player. At his turn, a 
player tossed the dice and moved his marker toward FINISH the 
number of spaces equal to the higher of his two die values 
multiplied by whichever of his power cards he chose to play 
at that turn. A player could use only one card at each turn, 
and a card could be used only once in the game. The player 
or coalition of players to reach FINISH first received one 
hundred points. The losing player or players received zero.
Three rules were used in this game: 1) Players could
form coalitions within their triad. Coalition partners 
played as a single unit. At the turn of a coalition, only 
one toss of the dice was made, but each member played a 
power card. Then both moved forward, together, the number 
of spaces equal to their higher die value multiplied by the 
sum of the two power cards. 2) Each coalition agreement 
had to include an agreement between the partners as to how 
they would divide the one hundred points if they should win. 
Points could be divided any way the partners chose. 3) 
Coalitions could be made and broken at will at any time in 
the game.
Nine subjects (three each of high, middle, and low 
Machs) were run during each session. At the end of the first 
game, two players from each table were systematically rotated 
to two other tables, so that all subjects played their second 
game in the completely new triad, but again composed of one
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high, one middle, and one low Mach. This procedure was re­
peated after every game. In the three control group sessions, 
the games were played according to the original instructions 
(see Appendix C) without further intervention. The low Machs 
in each of the three experimental group sessions were initially 
given the counter-Machiavellian instructions used by Walters 
(1973) (see Appendix D) relative to the true nature of the 
experiment and the manipulative tendencies of high Machs.
Other than this, the games in the experimental group sessions 
proceeded according to the original instructions (Geis, 1970).
At the end of each of the six sessions, each subject was 
given two hours of experimental credit for participation in 
the study. In addition, the subject who had obtained the 
most points each evening was given one extra hour of credit.
Three experimental assistants were present at each game 
session, one being stationed at each table. These assistants 
had a thorough knowledge of game procedure and scoring but 
were not familiar with the nature of the study or the Mach 
classification of any of the subjects. It was the role of the 
assistants to keep a record of the coalitions formed and point- 
splits for each game. A protocol sheet (see Appendix E) was 
provided each assistant during each game to systematize re­
cording (Geis, 1970). Subjects also kept a tally of their 
total points earned on score cards provided by the experi­
menter. In addition, each assistant rated the three players 
at her table for desire to win after each game.
24
At the end of each game session, each player was ashed 
to fill out a short questionnaire (see Appendix F) . The pur-'
I .pose of this procedure was to provide some hypotheses as to 
the players’ rationale for their game behavior, as well as 
to elicit any other comments or observations the subjects 
might want to offer.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Although Mach V Scale scores for those in the subject 
pool ranged from 80 to 120 points, the Mach scores for the 
fifty-four selected subjects ranged from 84 to 118 points. 
Those eighteen subjects categorized as low Machs scored 
between 84 and 92 points (mean score =88.8 points), mid­
dle Mach scores ranged from 98 to 102 points (mean score = 
100.3 points), and those selected as high Machs scored 
between 106 and 118 points on Christie’s Mach V Scale 
(mean score = 109,7 points). Analysis of variance of the 
high and low Mach Scale scores indicated that the txvo 
groups were highly significantly different with p 001 
(see Appendix G for statistical analysis summary table).
The total number of points scored for each high. Mach 
subject and each low Mach subject were calculated for games 
one through five, games six through ten, and games eleven 
through fifteen of the Con Game. The design for statis­
tical analysis was a conventional split plot utilizing 
three factors (Edwards, 1964). Factor A incorporated the 
experimental-control variable (A1 and A2, respectively),
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while Factor B was concerned with the Mach score ranking 
(high vs. low) of subjects (B1 and B2, respectively).
Factor C included each five-game sequence (Cl, C2, and 
C3, respectively) of the Con Game. Both the experimental 
design and scores for individual subjects are diagrammed 
in Table 1.
It should be noted that middle Mach scores were not 
included in the analysis. This was due to the fact that 
analysis of middle scores would have resulted in a lack of 
independence among the data and a consequent loss of degrees 
of freedom. Since middle Mach scores were not of major in­
terest in the present study, it was decided to retain 
greater degrees of freedom by eliminating analysis of mid­
dle Mach scores.
TABLE 1
Summary of Subjects’ Point Scores in the Con Game
S C l  
(games 1*5')
C 2
(games 6-10)
C 3
(games 11-15)
1 150 95 176. 6
. ft 
3
B 1 2 150 0 40
3 190 250 200o
CD (high) 45
100
300
200
140
200
410
rH 6 240 160 280
Oj+J 7 180 250 350e 8 100 270 125oe•H 9 100 0 200
ft 173.3o> 1 100 210ft
X 2 150 205 193.3w B 2 3 150 110 250
4 190 260 140
5 150 100 150*s
rH (low) 6 200 140 507 150 170 165
8 100 100 100
9 135 50 340
1 243.3 113.3 166.6
B 1 2 166. 6 73.3 166. 53 185 250 . 133.2
4 185 60 180
ft 5 150 100 250
3o (high) 6 200 250 250
u 7 150 50 66.6
CD 8 183.3 200 226.6
rHof , 9 150 200 83.3H
■H
CJ 1 0 230 149.9
Ou 2 213.3 100 233.2B 2 3 166.6 156,6 233. 2
4 215 250 20
5 150 50 150
Cvl (low) 6 220 350 350
< . 7 250 200 233.3
8 83.3 200 206. 69 1501 . . 150
166.6
........... ...... . --- !
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The analysis of variance for both main effects and 
interactions can be seen in Table 2:
TABLE 2
ANOVA Summary Table - Points Scored in the Con Game
Source Sums of Squares df • Mean Squares F
A 456.333 1 456.333 0.054
B 300.000 1 300.000 0. 035
A x B 10600.9 1 10600.9 1.249
S (A x B) 271580. 32 8486.87
C 19614.1 2 9807.07 1.937
A x C 5181.36 2 2590.68 0. 512
B x C 8016.67 2 4008.33 0. 792
A x B x C 5457.41 2 2728.71 0. 539
S (A x B)x C 324028. 64 5062.93
None of the main effects or interactions were statisti
cally significant (p 10). This is further exemplified by
examining Figures 2 through 5. Figure 2 provides a graph o:
the A x B interaction; that is, of the relationships between 
levels of Machiavellianism and the experimental vs. control 
group situation. Graphs of the A x B interaction over the 
three levels of C (five-game sequences within the Con Game) 
are shown in Figures 3 through 5,
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Graph indicating interaction of Factor A (Experimental [Al] 
vs. Control Group [A2]) with Factor B (High Mach [Bl] vs. 
Low Mach [B2]).
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Graph showing interaction of Experimental vs. Control 
condition (A1 and A2) with levels of Machiavellianism 
(High, Bl; Low, B2) over the first five-game session 
(Cl) of the Con Game.
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Graph showing interaction of Experimental vs. Control 
condition (A1 and A2) with levels of Machiavellianism 
(High, Bl; Low, B2) over the second five-game session 
(C2) of the Con Game,
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Graph showing interaction of Experimental vs. Control 
condition (A1 and A2) with levels of Machiavellianism 
(High, Bl; Low, B2) over the third five-game session 
(C3) of the Con Game.
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It was decided to conduct a number of subsequent analy­
ses of the data. Although these post hoc analyses had not 
been specified in the original design of the experiment, it 
was hoped that further analysis might provide some insight 
into the results already mentioned as well as stimulate pos­
sible research material for the future. The following fac­
tors were analyzed according to a conventional split plot 
design: number of proposals made by each subject, number of 
proposals accepted by each, number of proposals rejected by 
each player, number of coalitions broken by each player which 
served to win the game and number broken which lost the game, 
number of proposals made to each player, and response to each 
of the questions answered on the post-game questionnaire. 
Analysis of variance indicated that only one of these vari­
ables, number of proposals rejected by each player, was 
within .05 limits of statistical significance (p-C. 01).
(See Appendices H to K for ANOVA summary tables for variables 
not discussed in this chapter.) A summary table of this 
analysis is provided in Table 3.
Results for Factor A (experimental vs. control variable) 
show that those subjects in the experimental group rejected 
significantly more proposals than those in the control group. 
Factor B (high vs. low Machiavellian orientation) and the 
A x B interaction were not significant.
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TABLE 3
ANOVA Summary Table - 
Number of Proposals Rejected by Each Subject
Source______Sums of Squares df________Mean Squares________ F
A 30.2500 1 30.2500 6.630**
B 3.36111 1 3.36111 0.737
A x B 0.694444 1 0.694444 0.152
S (Ax B) 146.000 32 4.56250
It should be noted that two of the other variables men­
tioned above, number of proposals made to each subject and 
number of coalitions broken by each subject which lost the 
game for that person, came near statistical significance 
(p<.06 and p <.07, respectively). With regard to the number 
of.proposals made to each subject, results for Factor A 
(experimental vs. control variable) indicate that more pro­
posals were made to subjects in the experimental group than 
the control group. Factor B (high vs. low Machiavellian 
orientation) and the A x B interaction were not close to sig­
nificance. A summary table for this data is provided in 
Table 4.
The second variable on which near-significance was ob­
tained was number of coalitions broken by each subject that 
lost the game for that person. Although Factor A (experi­
mental vs. control variable) and Factor B (high vs. low
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TABLE 4 
ANOVA Summary Table - 
Number of Proposals Made to Each Subject
Source______Sums of Squares df Mean Squares_________ F
A 51.3611 1 51.3611 3.629
B 1.36111 1 1.36111 0.096
A x  B 0.27777 1 0.27777 0.002
S (A x B) 452.889 32 14.1528
Machiavellian orientation) were not close to significance, the 
A x B interaction reached the ,07 level of significance. Re­
sults indicate that in the control group condition, low Machs 
made more errors in breaking coalitions than high Machs while, 
in the experimental condition, the reverse occurred--high Machs 
broke more coalitions at a personally inopportune time than low
Machs. A summary table for this data is provided in Table 5:
TABLE 5
ANOVA Summary Table - Number of Coalitions
Broken by Each Subject That Lost The Game
Source______Sums of Squares______df   Mean Squares________ F
A 0.0000.00 1 0. 000000 0.000
B 0.000000 1 0.000000 0.000
A x B 1.00000 1 1.00000 3.349
S (A x B) 9.55556 32 0.298611
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Each experimental assistant rated players at her table 
after every game on desire to win. Ratings consisted of marking 
either ''high,” "medium,” or "low” for the trait. Although no 
formal statistical analysis was conducted on this variable,
Table 6 depicts a summary of the rating data. Results sug­
gest that the overwhelming majority of the subjects were rated 
in the middle range of enthusiasm for the game. Noting the low 
enthusiasm portion of the summary table, there is some indica­
tion that experimental subjects were less intent on winning the 
game than control subjects.
TABLE 6
Summary of Ratings of Subject Enthusiasm
High Enthusiasm Middle Enthusiasm Low Enthusiasm
Control Exper. Control Exper. Control Exper*
Games H M l ; H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L
1-5 4 4 6 1 2 7 32 31 33 32 26 20 8 9 6 12 17 18
6-10 7 9 8 6 8 8 36 32 33 35 31 29 1 2 3 4 6 8
11-15 6 8 7 13 9 11 37 34 36 30 29 30 1 2 1 1 6 3
Totals 17 21 21 
59
20 19 
65
26 105 97 102 
304
97 86 
262
79 10 13
33
10 17 29 
75
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Number for which no rating recorded: Control - 9; Experimental - 3.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results of this experiment do not support 
the hypotheses made prior to the onset of the study. These 
hypotheses consisted of the following three statements:
a. Low Machs in the experimental group who had re­
ceived counter-Machiavellian instructions would 
initially score more points in the Con Game than 
high Machs.
b. Low Machs would sustain this initial advantage 
over time.
c. Conversely, high Machs would not regain control 
of the game (i.e., consistently xvin more points 
than low Machs) over time.
In fact, low Machs in the experimental group who had re­
ceived counter-Machiavellian instructions did not initially 
score more points in the Con Game than high Machs. Observa­
tion of the data indicates that low Machs in neither the 
experimental nor control group significantly outscored high 
Machs during any of the three 5-game sequences (Cl, C2, and 
C3) which xvere statistically analyzed. Thus, the first
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hypothesis was unsupported resulting in an inability to ade­
quately test the second hypothesis. A similar non-significant 
relationship obtains with regard to high Mach scoring trends-- 
high Machs in neither the control nor experimental group ever 
showed evidence of manipulation by gaining significantly more 
points than low Machs. In other words, no significant dif­
ference in point scores were noted for either high or low 
Machs throughout any of the five-game sequences over both 
experimental and control conditions. A number of reasons for 
the non-significant outcome are possible:
1. It may be that Machiavellianism, as measured in 
this study, is not a useful construct to describe 
interpersonal behavior. Perhaps no real differ­
ences between subjects scoring high and those 
scoring low on the Mach V Scale were manifested 
in the Con Game. On the other hand, it may be 
that the Mach V Scale is not a useful instrument 
for predicting any behavioral differences in 
Machiavellian orientation if any, in fact, do 
exist.
2. The range of Mach V scores for the subjects was 
quite narrow (all were objectively within what 
has generally been described as the Middle Mach 
scoring range). It may be that the trait of 
Machiavellianism is observable behaviorally only 
in those subjects whose scores on the Mach Scales
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are more extreme. In effect, then, it may be 
that, due to lack of variability among subjects, 
the hypotheses presented above were not given an 
adequate test,
3. There was some indication that the number of games 
played during each session (fifteen) was too many, 
resulting in a number of the players becoming 
bored and losing interest. It was observed that 
some players tended to become restless, fidgeting 
and looking at their watches, later in the evening. 
Comments by players support this hypothesis: "You
get to a point after awhile when you don't care"
(a high Mach during game #13) ; "Everybody ',s doing 
them three at a time" (referring to forming a 
coalition of all three players) "so we can go 
home" (low Mach during game #13). Similarly, the 
subjects were asked to fill out questionnaires fol­
lowing the session and were asked to make comments 
concerning the game. Two middle Machs stated: "I
didn't care for fifteen consecutive games--too 
boring," and "The first couple of games I felt a 
need to win, but it tapered off fast." The comment 
of one high Mach is as follows: "Near the end I 
kind of lost interest and didn't really care how 
many points I got." It may be, then, that a lack 
of motivation on the part of the subjects had a
40
direct influence on the outcome of the experi­
ment- For example, high Machs may not have taken 
control of the game (i.e., won more points than 
low Machs) in the latter stages due to factors of 
boredom and fatigue because of the number of games 
played.
4. Another issue related to motivation is the possi­
bility that the stakes in the game were not high 
enough to give subjects a real incentive to win.
All of those participating were students in an 
introductory psychology course who were required 
to participate in research studies to earn experi­
mental credit. Although subjects were given credit 
for participation, an attempt was made to increase 
incentive by offering one extra credit hour each 
evening to the subject scoring the most points 
overall. In fact, however, it appeared from ob­
servation that this incentive was not particularly 
effective, A number of subjects laughed or made 
gestures when the extra credit hour was mentioned 
to indicate that they were not impressed. Simi­
larly, it was learned that, with the credit hours 
given for participation in the experiment, many 
subjects had fulfilled their requirement.and did 
not need the extra credit hour offered as incen­
tive. One sub j ect. commented,: thus : "If you had
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money alongside, it would probably last a little 
longer, you could get more involved." Here, then, 
is another issue of motivation which may have in­
fluenced the outcome of the experiment. It may 
be that the subjects did not perceive the stakes 
as being high enough to warrant making a strenuous 
effort to win.
5. The three experimental sessions were conducted
quite late in the school quarter, so that for many 
subjects final exams were only two to three weeks 
away. It was observed that a number of the stu­
dents discussed term papers that were coming due, 
end of quarter exams, etc, prior to the onset of 
the games and at breaks between games. It may be, 
then, that an extraneous variable was introduced 
unintentionally since experimental subjects may 
have been more preoccupied and concerned with 
school work than control subjects, who were run 
earlier in the quarter. Thus, subjects in the 
experimental condition may have been less atten­
tive to and interested in their participation in 
the Con Game. Support for this hypothesis can be 
obtained from the ratings of subject enthusiasm 
made by the three experimental assistants through­
out the games (see Table 6, p. 36). While "high"
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enthusiasm ratings were approximately equal for 
control and experimental group conditions, seventy- 
five ratings of ’’low" enthusiasm were made for sub­
jects in the experimental group in contrast to 
thirty-three ’’low” enthusiasm ratings for control 
group subjects. Similarly, it was noted that 
while giving counter-Machiavellian instructions 
to one group of experimental low Machs, the sub­
jects showed great inattentiveness. Little eye 
contact was made with the experimenter and one 
subject continued to clip her fingernails during 
administration of the directions. Although the 
experimenter raised her voice and clearly empha­
sized instructions in an attempt to elicit the 
subjects’ attention, no effect was perceived and 
the experimenter was left itfith the impression 
that the counter^Machiavellian instructions had 
made little impact on these particular subjects.
Thus, it may be that an attentional factor was 
operating particularly during the three experimental 
sessions which served to influence the negative 
outcome of the experiment.
Although the overall results of this experiment do not 
support the hypotheses made prior to the study, post hoc sta­
tistical analysis of several factors indicates that some
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interesting effects did result from the experimental manipu­
lation. The subjects in the experimental group rejected sig­
nificantly more proposals (p < . 01) than the control group. 
Similarly, a greater number of proposals (p<_.06) were made 
to high and low Machs in the experimental group over the con­
trol group. Since no significant differences (p = .13) were 
found in the number of proposals made by high and low Machs 
in the experimental group (recall that middle scores were not 
analyzed), it follows that the middle Machs were responsible 
for the increased number Of proposals in the experimental 
group such that a greater number of proposals might be made 
to highs and lows in this group over the control group. Ob­
servation of the data reveals that middle Machs made 69 pro­
posals in the control group and 103 in the experimental group.
The rationale for the increased number of proposals made 
by middle Machs appears to be that high and low Machs in the 
experimental group formed more coalitions with each other 
(sixty-five in the experimental group, forty-five in the con­
trol group) so that middle Machs, who were now being left out 
of coalitions, were forced to expend more effort to become a 
partner in a coalition and maintain that partnership. Thus, 
middle Machs proposed more coalitions to both high and low 
Machs in an attempt to break up existing high Mach— low Mach 
coalitions and become a member of another. It appears, how­
ever, that not only were high and low Machs forming more 
coalitions among themselves in the experimental condition,
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but they were also more resistant to having those coalitions 
broken up by a middle Mach, thus accounting for the signifi­
cantly greater number of proposals rejected in the experi­
mental condition--highs and lows rejected thirty-five middle 
Mach proposals in the experimental group in contrast to 
twenty-one rejections in the control group. It appears, 
then, that highs and lows in the experimental group tended 
to be more involved with each other and were more impervious 
to the influence of the middle Machs than those in the con­
trol group. As a result of the increased number of proposals 
by middle Machs and the greater number of coalitions between 
high and low Machs, a significantly greater number of pro­
posals were rejected in the experimental group as compared 
with the control group.
The greater number of coalitions between high and low 
Machs appears to be related to the experimental manipulation.
It may be that following the administration of counter- 
Machiavellian instructions, the low Machs maintained a more 
confident and assertive manner throughout the games, thus 
receiving more notice by the high Machs who then sought them 
for partners more frequently,
Further support for the hypothesis that low Machs in the 
experimental condition maintained a more aggressive and con­
fident manner comes from the fact that low Machs in the control 
group broke more proposals at an inopportune time than high 
Machs, while, in the experimental group, high Machs made the
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same error more frequently (p<1.07). In the control group, 
low Machs, who may have been less confident, made five errors 
in judgment when breaking coalitions in contrast to only two 
similar errors by high Machs. Observation of data from the 
experimental group, however, indicates that low Machs in 
this group made only two errors in breaking coalitions, giv­
ing support to the hypothesis that they were more calm and 
confident (rational) in the game-playing situation. Further­
more, it should be noted that high Machs in the experimental 
condition broke five coalitions at the wrong time in contrast 
to two in the control group. It may be that the more confi-’ 
dent and assertive manner of the low Machs in the experimental 
condition reduced the ability of high Machs to control the 
situation, resulting in a greater number of errors in judgment.
Thus, although the experimental subjects were not able to 
show significant differences in point accumulation in the games, 
a definite effect of the experimental manipulation was demon­
strated.
Further research is called for in this area. The present 
study should be replicated utilizing subjects who obtain more 
extreme scores on the Mach V Scale, in order to more ade­
quately evaluate the hypotheses proposed in this study. Simi­
larly, replication with emphasis on motivation of subjects to 
win should be undertaken. In this regard, limiting the number 
of games per session to nine or even twelve would be worthwhile,
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as would the use of a more appealing reward (e.g., money) for 
winning. An attempt, should also be made to assess the valid-" 
i.ty of the hypothesis that low Machs in the experimental group, 
subsequent to receiving counter-Machiavellian instructions, 
do, in fact, present a more confident and assertive manner, 
thus leading to greater involvement with high Machs during 
the games. Trained observers might be utilized to rate level 
of assertiveness of players. Other techniques might be self- 
report of low Machs as well as the report of high Machs re­
garding level of assertiveness of the lows and their own reac­
tion to the-low Machs* behavior. Another issue of interest is 
that concerning the extent to which subjects must score in the 
extreme ranges of the Mach scales in order to behaviorally 
manifest Machiavellian traits. Perhaps replication of this 
and other studies using Machiavellianism as the variable of 
interest might be undertaken using subjects with progressively 
more extreme scores in order to determine more adequately the 
limits of this trait both for practical and experimental pur­
poses.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The purpose of this investigation was twofold: (1) to
substantiate previous research findings that the effective­
ness of the manipulative behavior of high Machiavellians can 
be reduced by instructions to low Machiavellians; and (2) to 
determine if this reduction holds over time or whether high 
Machiavellians are able to recover and once more become suc­
cessful manipulators.
Fifty-four female subjects, eighteen each of high, mid­
dle, and low Mach orientation, were chosen from those admin­
istered Christie's Mach V Scale, During each of six sessions 
(three control and three experimental sessions) nine subjects 
(three each of high, middle and low Machiavellians) played the 
Con Game in an effort to win points. In the control condi­
tion, subjects were given the original instructions for the 
game and allowed to proceed. Counter-Machiavellian instruc­
tions were administered to the low Machs in the experimental 
group before play began.
Three major hypotheses regarding experimental outcome 
were developed:
1. low Machs in the experimental group who received
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counter-Machiavellian instructions would initially 
score more points in the Con Game than high Machs;
2. low Machs would sustain this initial advantage;
3. high Machs would not regain control of the game 
over time.
Analysis of variance of the data indicated, however, that 
these hypotheses were not supported overall by the experimental 
results. In fact, no significant differences in point accumu­
lation were noted for high or low Machs throughout the three 
five-game sequences in either the experimental or control con­
dition. It was noted, however, that high and low Machs in the 
experimental condition did reject significantly more pro­
posals than those in the control group. Similarly, more pro­
posals were made to high and low Machs in the experimental 
group over the control group and, finally, it was noted that 
low Machs in the control group broke more coalitions at aii 
inopportune time while, in the experimental group, high Machs 
made the same error more frequently. Thus, it appears that 
although no significant differences in point accumulation 
were noted, a significant effect of the experimental manipu­
lation was demonstrated.
Future research in this area might be aimed at replica­
tion of this study utilizing: 1) subjects with more extreme 
scores on the Mach V Scales, and 2) more appealing incentives 
to win. Similarly, research designed to investigate the over­
all parameters of the trait of Machiavellianism is encouraged.
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A P P E N D I C E S
A P P E N D I X  A
Mach IV
Directions
Print your name clearly on your answer sheet.
Mark your answers to the following items on your answer 
sheet, not in the question booklet. If you want to change an 
answer, erase the incorrect mark as thoroughly as possible.
Be sure that you have marked only one alternative for each 
item.
Listed below are a number of statements. Each represents 
a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. 
You will probably disagree with some items and agree with others. 
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with such matters of opinion.
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree by blacking out the corresponding 
alternative on your answer sheet. The number alternatives and 
their meanings are:
If you disagree strongly Mark 1
If you disagree somewhat Mark 2
If you disagree slightly Mark 3
No opinion Mark 4
If you agree slightly Mark 5
If you agree somewhat Mark 6
If you agree strongly Mark 7
First impressions, are usually best in such matters. Read
each statement, decide if, you agree or disagree and the strength
of your opinion, and then mark the appropriate alternative on the 
answer sheet. Read the items carefully, but work as rapidly as 
you can. Give your opinion on every statement.
If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not 
adequately indicate your own opinion, use the one which is 
closest to the way you feel.
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless 
it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want
to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak' 
and it will come out when they are given a chance.
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6. Most people are basically good and kind.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they're 
forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be 
important and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to
give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving
reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for 
trouble.
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people 
is that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
14. Most men are brave.
15. It is wise to flatter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a stacker born 
every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and 
there.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the 
choice of being put painlessly to death.
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than 
the loss of their property.
CHECK YOUR ANSWER SHEET TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM.
A P P E N D I X  B
Mach V
Directions
Mark your answers to the following items on your answer sheet, 
not in the question booklet. If you need to change an answer, 
erase the incorrect mark as thoroughly as possible. Be sure that 
you have marked two alternatives for each item.
Below are twenty groups of statements. Each group contains 
three statements. Each one refers to a way of thinking about 
people or things in general. They reflect opinions and not mat­
ters of fact, and different people have been found to agree with 
different ones.
Read the three statements in each group. Decide first which 
of the three, A, B, or C, is most true or comes the closest to 
describing your own beliefs. Mark a + on the answer-sheet next 
to the letter that represents this statement. Then decide which 
of the remaining two statements is most false or the farthest from 
your own beliefs, Write a 0 on the answer sheet next to this let­
ter.
Here is an example:
( ) A. It is easy to persuade people but hard to keep them 
persuaded,
(+) B. Theories that run counter to common sense are a 
waste of time.
(0) C. It is only common sense to go along with what other 
people are doing and not be too different.
In this case, statement B would be the one you believe most 
strongly (or reject least strongly), and A and C would be less 
characteristic of your opinion. Statement C would be the one you 
believe least strongly of the three. On your answer sheet you 
would mark a + next to B and a 0 next to C.
You will find some of the choices easy to make; others will 
be quite difficult. Do not fail to make a choice no matter how 
hard it may be. Do not omit any groups of statements.
21. A, It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal 
than a successful businessman.
B. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good inten­
tions" contains a lot of truth.
C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father 
than the loss of their property.
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22. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with
the clothes their wives wear.
B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in 
children be cultivated.
C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the 
choice of being put painlessly to death.
23. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless
it is useful to do so.
B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should 
be worked for before anything else.
C. Once a truly intelligent person makes up his mind about 
the answer to a problem he rarely continues to think 
about it.
24. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is
bad for our country.
B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they 
want to hear.
C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others 
less fortunate than themselves.
25. A. Most people are basically good and kind.
B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility-- 
other characteristics are nice but not essential.
C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should 
he concern himself with the injustices in the world.
26. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
lives.
B, Any man worth his salt shouldn’t be blamed for putting 
his career above his family,
C. People would be better off if they were concerned less 
with how to do things and more with what to do.
27. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions
rather than gives explicit answers.
B. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best
to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giv­
ing reasons which might carry more weight.
C. A persons's job is the best single guide as to the sort of
person he is.
28. A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian
pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who 
built them.
B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is 
best to stick with it.
C. One should take action only when sure that it is morally 
right.
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29. A. The world Would be a much better place to live in if
people would let the future take care of itself and con­
cern themselves only with enjoying the present.
B. It is wise to flatter important people.
C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep chang­
ing it as new circumstances arise.
30. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things
you do because you have no other choice.
B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other
people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark 
of decency somewhere within him.
31. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to
be important and dishonest.
, B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good
chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.
C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't 
very important.
32. A. A person shouldn’t be punished for breaking a law which
he thinks is unreasonable.
B, Too many criminals are not punished for their crime.
C. There is no excuse for lying to Someone else.
33. A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're
forced to do so,
B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after 
he commits a serious mistake.
C. People who can't make up their minds aren't worth bother­
ing about.
34. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his
mother.
B. Most men are brave.
C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimu­
lating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around,
35. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning
oneself about.
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and 
there.
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful
to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.
36. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can
change your mind easily.
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with 
everyone.
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
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37. A. It is possible to be good in all respects.
B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better.
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human 
life.
38. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there’s at
least one sucker born every minute,
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up 
some excitement.
C. Most people would be better off if they controlled 
their emotions.
39. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more
than poise in social situations,
B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place 
and accepts it.
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious 
streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
40. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't
know what they are talking about.
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for 
trouble.
C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that 
everyone vote.
CHECK YOUR ANSWER SHEET TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM.
A P P E N D I X  C
GAME INSTRUCTIONS
The game consists, essentially, of a race from START to 
FINISH. At his turn, each player tosses the dice, and moves 
his marker toward FINISH the number of spaces equal to the pro­
duct of the higher of the two die faces and whichever of his 
power coefficients he chooses. The player or coalition unit 
to reach FINISH first receives the prize of 100 points for that 
game.
1. The experimenter in charge of your table will assign each
player a set of power coefficients for the game. One of these
coefficients must be played at each turn, and then cannot be 
used again in that game.
2. After the power coefficients have been assigned, players 
may bargain for coalitions to improve their chances in the game. 
Coalitions may be formed between any two or all three competi­
tors at a table. Coalition partners play as a single unit with 
power at each turn equal to the sum of all individual coefficients 
played at that turn. For example, in a coalition of A and B, if
A plays a. coefficient of 2, and B plays one of 8, their coali­
tion would have the power of 10 for that turn, and they would 
multiply the result of the dice toss by 10 to determine their 
move for that turn.
A coalition agreement is entered by consent of the players 
involved and must include an agreement as to how they will divide 
the prize of 100 points between them in the event their coali­
tion wins the game.
Coalitions can be formed at any time before the end of the 
game. Coalitions formed after play has begun start midway be­
tween the positions of the partners.
Coalitions can be broken at any time before the end of the 
game. A two-man coalition is automatically broken, if either 
member accepts a coalition offer from the third player, or if 
either member makes a coalition offer to the third player and 
he accepts it.
3. Each player or coalition unit tosses the dice to determine 
order of play. The higher player goes first.
4. In turn, each player tosses the dice, plays one of his 
power coefficients, and moves his marker toward FINISH the num­
ber of spaces equal to the product of the higher die face and 
his power at that turn. In coalition units, only one member 
tosses the dice for the coalition, each member plays a power 
coefficient, and all members move a number of spaces equal to 
the product of the higher die face and the sum of all coeffi­
cients played at that turn.
Note that since your power coefficients are used to multi­
ply your die values, you will do better if you use one of your
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lower coefficients when you have a low die value, and save your 
higher coefficients for your higher die values: e.g., (1 x 1)
+ ( 5 x 5 )  is greater than ( 1 x 5 )  + (5 x 1).
5. The player or coalition unit to reach FINISH first receives 
the 100 point prize, and the game is over.
6. Any player may concede at any time. In this event the other 
two players continue the game.
7. All players record their score at the end of the game 
(whether they have won any points in that game or not).
8. The enforcement of these rules is the responsibility of 
the players, not the experimenter, However, the experimenter 
may intervene if she chooses, and will arbitrate if the players 
cannot agree among themselves.
9. The experimenter may, at any time, announce a time limit 
for the completion of a game. If a time limit expires before the 
game is completed, the prize is forfeited and all players receive 
a zero for that game.
10. The experimenter in charge of each table will make notes on 
the bargaining that occurs during the game. To make this easier 
for us, please state your coalition offers in terms of the num­
ber of prize points you are offering your prospective partner.
Remember, the objective results of your decisions will be 
evaluated by the number of points you succeed in winning in each 
individual game, and over the entire tournament. The player 
with the highest grand total wins the tournament.
A P P E N D I X D
COUNTER-MACHIAVELLIAN INSTRUCTIONS
The object of this game is, of course, to win as many 
points as possible. Your best chance of winning occurs if you 
are willing to form coalitions, but are just as willing to 
break them if rt .is 'to your advantage.
In other words, the people who do best at this game are 
willing to go back on agreements, even if that seems dishonest, 
and even if it may upset your partner or make him angry at you. 
To win at this game, you must put your feelings aside, and 
really take a cool, unemotional look at what will be most to 
your advantage. We have a name for people who can do this. We 
call them "gamesmen." There is a "gamesman" sitting in on every 
one of these games. The gamesman doesn’t seem any different 
than anyone else, is not any more intelligent or expert than 
you, but the gamesman usually wins because he (1) stays calm 
and emotionally uninvolved, and (2) he isn’t a bit afraid to 
lie or break an agreement.
You, on the other hand, seem not to be a "gamesman." Your 
test scores indicate that you do care if you break an agreement, 
and that you do get very emotionally involved in the game. You 
worry about the impression you make on the other players, and 
that makes it easier for them to take advantage of you.
In the games that you are about to play, I want you to 
really try to win, no matter what. Watch out for the "games - 
man:" he’11 try to trick you or take advantage of you. Try to 
give him a dose of his own medicine; look out for your own 
best interests and really look out for yourself.-
Any questions?
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A P P E N D I X  E
Protocol Sheet for Scoring Con Game
Game Table E: Date
 ■ 1
 _ 2
______ ;___. 3
  ______  ' 4
_________________ 5
 6
_____________________ 7
 8
______ '__________ 9
 _ 10
    11
 .  12
___________   13
______ 14
 __________ 15
     16
______;_________ .17
-— ZLZ3— J  is
Point Totals*
*Remember to note how involved each player seemed during the game (H, M, L). 
Record the following:
1. (P) Proposal to form a coalition. If a specific point split it sug­
gested, the number of points the initiator is offering the recipient
is recorded.
2. (#) Acceptance of a coalition proposal.
3. (n) Rejection of a coalition proposal,
4. (//) Breaking an existing coalition.
A B . . .  c
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A P P E N D I X  F
N a m e __________________
Date:___________________
POST GAME QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer all of the following questions by. circling the 
response which most indicates how you feel.
1. How much did you enjoy playing these games?
a. Very much
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all
2. How hard did you try to win in these games?
a. Very hard
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all
3. How important was it for you to win?
a. Very important
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not important at all
4. Was it important to you to cooperate with the experimenter 
while playing these games.
a. Very much
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all.
Please feel free to write any comments you may have here:
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A P P E N D I X  G
ANOVA Summary Table 
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F
A 2.25000 1 2.25000 0.656
B 3990.03 1 3990.03 1163.085***
A x  B 250.694 1 250.694 73.077***
S (A x B) 109.778 32 3.43056
Analysis of Variance of Mach V Scale Scores
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A P P E N D I X  H
ANOVA Summary Table
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares
A
B
A x B 
S'(A x B)
64,0000
0.111111
0.444445
869.333
1
1
1
32
64.0000
0.111111
0,444445
27.1667
2.356
0.004
0.016
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Made by Each 
Subj ect
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A P P E N D I X  I
ANOYA Summary Table
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares
A
B
A x B 
S (A x B)
2.77778
0.444444
1. 00000 
303.778
1
1
1
32
2.77778 
0.444444
1.00000 
9.49306
0. 293 
0.047 
0.105
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Accepted by 
Each Subject
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A P P E N D I X  J
ANOVA Summary Table
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares
A
B
A x B 
S (A x B)
1.00000 
0.444444 
2.77778 
48.0000
1
1
1
32
1.00000 
0.444444 
2.77778 
1.50000
0,
0,
1,
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Broken 
Each Subject That Were Beneficial
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F
,667 
.296 
, 852
by
A P P E N D I X  K
Analysis of Variance of 
Questionnaire.
Responses to Questions on the Post-Game
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F
A 0.111111 1\ 0.111111 0.205
B 0.111111 1 0.111111 0.205
A x B 0.000000 1 0.000000 0.000
S (A x B) 17.3333 32 0.S41667
ANOVA Summary Table - Question #1
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F
A 0.444444 1 0 .444444 1. 306
B 0.111111 1 0.111111 0.327
A x B 0.111111 1 0.111111 0. 327
S (A x B) 10.8889 32 0.340278
ANOVA Summary Table :-Question #2
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F
A 0.694444 1 0.694444 0. 893
B 0.69444 1 0.69444 0.893
A x B 0.694444 1 0. 694444 0. 893
S (A x B) 24.8889 32 0.777778
ANOVA Summary Table - Question #3
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Source
A
B
A x B 
S (A x
68
Sums of Squares df Mean Squares
0
0.444444
0.444444
1.77778
29.5556
1
1
1
32
0.444444
0.444444
1.77778
0.923611
0.481
0.481
1.925
ANOVA Summary Table - Question #4
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